6594 | Stoics said that correct judgement needs an invincible criterion of truth [Stoic school, by Fogelin] |
1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
22108 | First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas] |
22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
18265 | We don't judge by combining subject and concept; we get a concept by splitting up a judgement [Frege] |
21725 | The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
23474 | A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead] |
23455 | The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead] |
23480 | The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead] |
18275 | Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead] |
5375 | Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell] |
21711 | Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
5427 | Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell] |
17613 | We should judge principles by the science, not science by some fixed principles [Zermelo] |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
7535 | If all beliefs are propositional, then belief and judgement are the same thing [Monk] |
12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
22273 | Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter] |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
23554 | Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M] |