10913 | Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle] |
10914 | Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle] |
10916 | Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle] |
5728 | The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius] |
2673 | There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero] |
4748 | Anselm of Canterbury identified truth with God [Anselm, by Engel] |
23176 | Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas] |
20621 | Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
21864 | Truth is its own standard [Spinoza] |
19333 | A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz] |
12910 | The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz] |
8098 | Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert] |
5420 | Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell] |
21953 | For Heidegger there is 'ontic' truth or 'uncoveredness', as in "he is a true friend" [Heidegger, by Wrathall] |
23884 | Truth is a value of thought [Weil] |
15471 | Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB] |
6276 | 'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam] |
4714 | Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
4701 | To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady] |
4703 | The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady] |
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
15323 | Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten] |
15324 | Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten] |
16330 | Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach] |
16339 | Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach] |
18819 | The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt] |