21259 | To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is [Plato] |
10943 | Essence only belongs to things whose account is a definition [Aristotle] |
10963 | A thing's essence is what is mentioned in its definition [Aristotle, by Lawson-Tancred] |
11292 | Things have an essence if their explanation is a definition [Aristotle] |
11287 | Essence is what is stated in the definition [Aristotle, by Politis] |
12091 | If definition is of universals, many individuals have no definition, and hence no essence [Aristotle, by Witt] |
12146 | Definitions recognise essences, so are not themselves essences [Aristotle] |
11200 | The definition of a physical object must include the material as well as the form [Aquinas] |
17865 | Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog] |
12981 | Essence is just the possibility of a thing [Leibniz] |
23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
12067 | An Aristotelian essence is a nonlinguistic correlate of the definition [Witt] |
14260 | An object only essentially has a property if that property follows from every definition of the object [Fine,K] |
11179 | If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K] |
16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
17866 | Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog] |
17868 | Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog] |
17871 | Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog] |
17872 | Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog] |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |