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1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual

[metaphysics as study of our conceptual schemes]

24 ideas
For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant]
Logic is metaphysics, the science of things grasped in thoughts [Hegel]
Metaphysics is the lattice which makes incoming material intelligible [Hegel]
If we start with indeterminate being, we arrive at being and nothing as a united pair [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality... [Hegel, by Houlgate]
We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being [Hegel]
Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte]
Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce]
The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C]
Nietzsche has a metaphysics, as well as perspectives - the ontology is the perspectives [Nietzsche, by Richardson]
We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine]
Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine]
Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm]
Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P]
Serious metaphysics cares about entailment between sentences [Jackson]
Philosophy devises and assesses conceptual schemes in the service of worldviews [Harré/Madden]
Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe]
Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]
It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider]
Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle]
Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions [Loux/Zimmerman]
Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin]
Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross]
Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt]