21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
21702 | In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine] |
23453 | Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead] |
19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell] |
22302 | Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter] |
9085 | If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga] |
16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |