| 4766 | Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects [Hume] |
| 7186 | There are no necessary truths, but something must be held to be true [Nietzsche] |
| 4528 | For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche] |
| 9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
| 8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
| 10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
| 8206 | Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia [Quine] |
| 4577 | There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine] |
| 9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
| 15090 | Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker] |
| 4718 | If necessity is always relative to a description in a language, then there is only 'de dicto' necessity [Putnam, by O'Grady] |
| 14919 | Empiricists deny what is unobservable, and reject objective modality [Fraassen] |
| 19284 | Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn] |
| 20475 | Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo] |
| 11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
| 3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
| 9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
| 14589 | A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne] |
| 14598 | Abstracta imply non-logical brute necessities, so only nominalists can deny such things [Dorr] |