15472 | It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB] |
5482 | Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis] |
16959 | If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett] |
12255 | For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis] |
9219 | Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider] |
15022 | If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis] |
10469 | A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis] |
16283 | For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis] |
12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
10982 | How can modal Platonists know the truth of a modal proposition? [Read] |
12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |