structure for 'Persons'    |     alphabetical list of themes    |     expand these ideas

16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will

[defences of the existence of wills which are free]

22 ideas
Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle]
There is no necessity to live with necessity [Epicurus]
Chrysippus allows evil to say it is fated, or even that it is rational and natural [Plutarch on Chrysippus]
You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus]
Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes]
We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes]
Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid]
We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Kant, by Korsgaard]
If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing [Kant]
We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant]
Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte]
I am aware that freedom is possible, and the freedom is not in theory, but in seeking freedom [Jaspers]
If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm]
Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]
We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]