14236 | Each horse doesn't fall under the concept 'horse that draws the carriage', because all four are needed [Oliver/Smiley on Frege] |
12798 | Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine] |
14235 | Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile] |
10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
15731 | Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis] |
15518 | I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis] |
15525 | Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis] |
10268 | Maybe plural quantifiers should be understood in terms of classes or sets [Shapiro] |
12845 | Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons] |
10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
10778 | Can second-order logic be ontologically first-order, with all the benefits of second-order? [Linnebo] |
10783 | Plural quantification depends too heavily on combinatorial and set-theoretic considerations [Linnebo] |
14234 | If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley] |
14237 | We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley] |
12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
10666 | Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack] |
10669 | Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack] |
10675 | A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack] |
14232 | We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins] |