| 21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
| 23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
| 23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
| 21597 | Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson] |
| 6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 10905 | My fundamental idea is that the 'logical constants' do not represent [Wittgenstein] |
| 11065 | The inferential role of a logical constant constitutes its meaning [Gentzen, by Hanna] |
| 11023 | The logical connectives are 'defined' by their introduction rules [Gentzen] |
| 11213 | Each logical symbol has an 'introduction' rule to define it, and hence an 'elimination' rule [Gentzen] |
| 13829 | If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine] |
| 17896 | We need to know the meaning of 'and', prior to its role in reasoning [Prior,AN, by Belnap] |
| 17898 | Prior's 'tonk' is inconsistent, since it allows the non-conservative inference A |- B [Belnap on Prior,AN] |
| 11021 | Prior rejected accounts of logical connectives by inference pattern, with 'tonk' his absurd example [Prior,AN, by Read] |
| 13836 | Maybe introducing or defining logical connectives by rules of inference leads to absurdity [Prior,AN, by Hacking] |
| 14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
| 13837 | With a pure notion of truth and consequence, the meanings of connectives are fixed syntactically [Hacking] |
| 13357 | Truth-functors are usually held to be defined by their truth-tables [Bostock] |
| 13825 | Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz] |
| 11175 | Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K] |
| 10212 | Classical connectives differ from their ordinary language counterparts; '∧' is timeless, unlike 'and' [Shapiro] |
| 15407 | Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess] |
| 16974 | The nature of each logical concept is given by a collection of inference rules [Correia] |
| 14186 | Logical connectives contain no information, but just record combination relations between facts [Read] |
| 18782 | The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares] |
| 15019 | Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider] |
| 4704 | Wittgenstein reduced Russell's five primitive logical symbols to a mere one [O'Grady] |
| 18489 | Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride] |
| 18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
| 11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
| 11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
| 18802 | In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt] |