8422 | Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume] |
15468 | Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB] |
8437 | The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett] |
8438 | A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett] |
8396 | Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley] |
8428 | Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim] |
8429 | Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
9659 | Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis] |
8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
8432 | Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich] |
11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
16847 | Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton] |
16215 | Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley] |
9445 | We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford] |
4774 | Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos] |
16250 | We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin] |
16248 | Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin] |
16267 | If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin] |
16268 | The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin] |
16269 | If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin] |
17526 | The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird] |
14572 | Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause? [Mumford/Anjum] |
14573 | Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false [Mumford/Anjum] |
14574 | Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation [Mumford/Anjum] |
22902 | Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon] |
23015 | The counterfactual theory of causation handles the problem no matter what causes actually are [Baron/Miller] |
23016 | Counterfactual theories struggle with pre-emption by a causal back-up system [Baron/Miller] |
22634 | Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson] |
22635 | People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson] |
22637 | Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson] |