22013 | Subjects distinguish representations, as related both to subject and object [Reinhold] |
6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
7549 | If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell] |
7553 | Sense-data are purely physical [Russell] |
17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
6457 | Sensations are mental, but sense-data could be mind-independent [Vesey] |
6454 | Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey] |
6453 | Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey] |
2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
6480 | Sense-data do not have any intrinsic intentionality [Robinson,H] |
6482 | For idealists and phenomenalists sense-data are in objects; representative realists say they resemble objects [Robinson,H] |
2713 | Are sense-data independent, with identity, substance and location? [Tye] |