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Single Idea 3411

[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes ]

Full Idea

How do you find out that you believe, rather than, say, doubt or merely hope, that it will rain tomorrow?

Gist of Idea

How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another?

Source

Jaegwon Kim (Philosophy of Mind [1996], p.159)

Book Ref

Kim,Jaegwon: 'Philosophy of Mind' [Westview 1998], p.159

A Reaction

There should be a special medal created for philosophers who ask reasonable questions which are impossible to answer. They are among the greatest discoveries.

The 108 ideas from Jaegwon Kim

4781 Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]
8396 Many counterfactuals have nothing to do with causation [Kim, by Tooley]
8429 Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
8428 Causation is not the only dependency relation expressed by counterfactuals [Kim]
8430 Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
3536 Supervenient properties must have matching base properties [Kim]
3535 All observable causes are merely epiphenomena [Kim]
10369 How fine-grained Kim's events are depends on how finely properties are individuated [Kim, by Schaffer,J]
8974 Events are composed of an object with an attribute at a time [Kim, by Simons]
8975 Events cannot be merely ordered triples, but must specify the link between the elements [Kim, by Simons]
8976 If events are ordered triples of items, such things seem to be sets, and hence abstract [Simons on Kim]
8977 Since properties like self-identity and being 2+2=4 are timeless, Kim must restrict his properties [Simons on Kim]
8980 Kim's theory results in too many events [Simons on Kim]
4779 For Kim, events are exemplifications of properties by objects at particular times [Kim, by Psillos]
14470 Explanatory exclusion: there cannot be two separate complete explanations of a single event [Kim]
13314 Protagoras says arguments on both sides are always equal [Kim, by Seneca]
2308 Identity theory was overthrown by multiple realisations and causal anomalies [Kim]
2309 Non-Reductive Physicalism relies on supervenience [Kim]
2310 Supervenience is linked to dependence [Kim]
2311 Maybe strong supervenience implies reduction [Kim]
2313 Emergentism says there is no explanation for a supervenient property [Kim]
2314 Maybe intentionality is reducible, but qualia aren't [Kim]
2315 Mereological supervenience says wholes are fixed by parts [Kim]
2317 Reductionism is good on light, genes, temperature and transparency [Kim, by PG]
2318 Agency, knowledge, reason, memory, psychology all need mental causes [Kim, by PG]
2319 Metaphysics is the clarification of the ontological relationships between different areas of thought [Kim]
2320 Properties can have causal powers lacked by their constituents [Kim]
2322 Multiple realisation applies to other species, and even one individual over time [Kim]
2323 Emotions have both intentionality and qualia [Kim]
2325 It seems impossible that an exact physical copy of this world could lack intentionality [Kim]
2324 Intentionality as function seems possible [Kim]
2327 Knowledge and inversion make functionalism about qualia doubtful [Kim]
2328 The only mental property that might be emergent is that of qualia [Kim]
2329 Causal power is a good way of distinguishing the real from the unreal [Kim]
2065 Not every person is the measure of all things, but only wise people [Plato on Kim]
1550 Why didn't Protagoras begin by saying "a tadpole is the measure of all things"? [Plato on Kim]
530 There are two contradictory arguments about everything [Kim]
8825 It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim]
3359 Cartesian dualism fails because it can't explain mental causation [Kim]
3360 Are pains pure qualia, or do they motivate? [Kim]
3362 Supervenience says all souls are identical, being physically indiscernible [Kim]
3363 We often can't decide what emotion, or even sensation, we are experiencing [Kim]
3366 Pain has no reference or content [Kim]
3365 Intentionality involves both reference and content [Kim]
3367 Both thought and language have intentionality [Kim]
3368 Mind is basically qualities and intentionality, but how do they connect? [Kim]
3369 Logical behaviourism translates mental language to behavioural [Kim]
3370 What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim]
3371 Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim]
3372 Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim]
3373 Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim]
3374 Token physicalism isn't reductive; it just says all mental events have some physical properties [Kim]
3375 If an orange image is a brain state, are some parts of the brain orange? [Kim]
3376 We can't assess evidence about mind without acknowledging phenomenal properties [Kim]
3377 Elimination can either be by translation or by causal explanation [Kim]
3379 Neurons seem to be very similar and interchangeable [Kim]
3380 Are dispositions real, or just a type of explanation? [Kim]
3382 A machine with a mind might still fail the Turing Test [Kim]
3383 The Turing Test is too specifically human in its requirements [Kim]
3384 The person couldn't run Searle's Chinese Room without understanding Chinese [Kim]
3387 A culture without our folk psychology would be quite baffling [Kim]
3386 Folk psychology has been remarkably durable [Kim]
3388 Machine functionalism requires a Turing machine, causal-theoretical version doesn't [Kim]
3389 Inverted qualia and zombies suggest experience isn't just functional [Kim]
3391 Crosswiring would show that pain and its function are separate [Kim, by PG]
3390 Are inverted or absent qualia coherent ideas? [Kim]
3393 How do functional states give rise to mental causation? [Kim]
3392 Mind is only interesting if it has causal powers [Kim]
3394 Maybe folk psychology is a simulation, not a theory [Kim]
3397 Beliefs cause other beliefs [Kim]
3396 Experiment requires mental causation [Kim]
3399 If epiphenomenalism were true, we couldn't report consciousness [Kim]
3401 A common view is that causal connections must be instances of a law [Kim]
3403 We assume people believe the obvious logical consequences of their known beliefs [Kim]
3402 If someone says "I do and don't like x", we don't assume a contradiction [Kim]
3406 Counterfactuals are either based on laws, or on nearby possible worlds [Kim, by PG]
3407 Laws are either 'strict', or they involve a 'ceteris paribus' clause [Kim]
3408 Two identical brain states could have different contents in different worlds [Kim]
3409 Mental substance causation makes physics incomplete [Kim]
3410 Folk psychology has adapted to Freudianism [Kim]
3412 How do we distinguish our anger from embarrassment? [Kim]
3411 How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim]
3414 What could demonstrate that zombies and inversion are impossible? [Kim]
3413 Zombies and inversion suggest non-reducible supervenience [Kim]
3416 Content may match several things in the environment [Kim]
3417 Content depends on other content as well as the facts [Kim]
3418 'Arthritis in my thigh' requires a social context for its content to be meaningful [Kim]
3419 Pain, our own existence, and negative existentials, are not external [Kim]
3421 Content is best thought of as truth conditions [Kim]
3420 Two types of water are irrelevant to accounts of behaviour [Kim]
3422 Externalism about content makes introspection depend on external evidence [Kim]
3424 Most modern physicalists are non-reductive property dualists [Kim]
3426 If one theory is reduced to another, we make fewer independent assumptions about the world [Kim]
3427 Reductionism is impossible if there aren't any 'bridge laws' between mental and physical [Kim]
3428 Behaviourism reduces mind to behaviour via bridging principles [Kim]
3430 Resemblance or similarity is the core of our concept of a property [Kim]
3431 Supervenience suggest dependence without reduction (e.g. beauty) [Kim]
3432 Is weight a 'resultant' property of water, but transparency an 'emergent' property? [Kim]
3434 Emergent properties are 'brute facts' (inexplicable), but still cause things [Kim]
3433 The core of the puzzle is the bridge laws between mind and brain [Kim]
3436 Should properties be individuated by their causal powers? [Kim]
3437 'Physical facts determine all the facts' is the physicalists' slogan [Kim]
3438 Reductionists deny new causal powers at the higher level [Kim]
3439 Reductionism gets stuck with qualia [Kim]
3440 Without reductionism, mental causation is baffling [Kim]
13745 Supervenience is not a dependence relation, on the lines of causal, mereological or semantic dependence [Kim]
13746 Supervenience is just a 'surface' relation of pattern covariation, which still needs deeper explanation [Kim]
15456 Extrinsic properties, unlike intrinsics, imply the existence of a separate object [Kim, by Lewis]