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Single Idea 18020

[filed under theme 18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes ]

Full Idea

Three views of the semantics of propositional attitudes: they are relations between agents and propositions ('propositional' view); relations between individuals and meanings (Fregean); or relations of individuals and sentences/utterances ('sentential').

Gist of Idea

Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances

Source

Ofra Magidor (Category Mistakes [2013], 3.4)

Book Ref

Magidor,Ofra: 'Category Mistakes' [OUP 2013], p.63


A Reaction

I am a propositionalist on this one. Meanings are too vague, and sentences are too linguistic.


The 8 ideas with the same theme [attitudes to propositions, such as belief, desire, hope, regret]:

In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes]
How do we distinguish our attitudes from one another? [Kim]
Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon]
Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
Some attitudes are information (belief), others motivate (hatred) [Rey]
Propositional attitudes require representation [Lyons]
To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson]
Propositional attitudes relate agents to either propositions, or meanings, or sentence/utterances [Magidor]