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Full Idea
Evans says intuitively a sentence is 'superficially' contingent if the function from worlds to truth values assigns F to some world; it is 'deeply' contingent if understanding it does not guarantee that there is a verifying state of affairs.
Gist of Idea
'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification
Source
report of Gareth Evans (Reference and Contingency [1979]) by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro - Introduction to 'Two-Dimensional Semantics' 2
Book Ref
'Two-Dimensional Semantics', ed/tr. Garcia-Carpentero/Macia [OUP 2006], p.3
A Reaction
This distinction is used by Davies and Humberstone (1980) to construct an early version of 2-D semantics (see under Language|Semantics). The point is that part comes from understanding it, and another part from assigning truth values.
| 6215 | 'Contingent' means that the cause is unperceived, not that there is no cause [Hobbes] |
| 4299 | Contingency is an illusion, resulting from our inadequate understanding [Spinoza, by Cottingham] |
| 4824 | We only call things 'contingent' in relation to the imperfection of our knowledge [Spinoza] |
| 4839 | Reason naturally regards things as necessary, and only imagination considers them contingent [Spinoza] |
| 5040 | Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz] |
| 4307 | A reason must be given why contingent beings should exist rather than not exist [Leibniz] |
| 21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
| 17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
| 14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |