more from this thinker | more from this text
Full Idea
It is plain that general and universal belong not to the real existence of things; but are the inventions and creatures of the understanding, made by it for its own use, and concern only signs, whether words or ideas.
Gist of Idea
General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas
Source
John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 3.03.11)
Book Ref
Locke,John: 'Essay Concerning Human Understanding', ed/tr. Nidditch,P.H. [OUP 1979], p.414
A Reaction
Frege and Geach viciously attacked this view, and it seems to be discredited, but I think it is time for a revival, given that the alternative view seems to lead to platonism. I take the first step in mental abstractionism to be pre-verbal.
| 5105 | The incommensurability of the diagonal always exists, and so it is not in time [Aristotle] |
| 8910 | General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke] |
| 6717 | Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley] |
| 7700 | We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles [Hume] |
| 8911 | If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege] |
| 8634 | The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege] |
| 8960 | Internal questions about abstractions are trivial, and external ones deeply problematic [Carnap, by Szabó] |
| 10136 | Points in Euclidean space are abstract objects, but not introduced by abstraction [Fine,K] |
| 10144 | Postulationism says avoid abstract objects by giving procedures that produce truth [Fine,K] |
| 10145 | Abstracts cannot be identified with sets [Fine,K] |
| 12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
| 4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
| 14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |