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Single Idea 21325

[filed under theme 16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity ]

Full Idea

Suppose a brave officer, flogged as a boy for robbing an orchard, to have captured a standard in his first campaign, and become a general in advanced life. [If the general forgets the flogging] he is and at the same time is not the same as the boy.

Gist of Idea

Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten!

Source

Thomas Reid (Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory [1785], III.Ch 6)

Book Ref

'Personal Identity', ed/tr. Perry,John [University of California 1975], p.114

A Reaction

The point is that strict identity has to be transitive, and if the general forgets his boyhood that breaks the transitivity. If identity is less strict there is no problem. The general may only have memories related to some part of his boyhood.

The 16 ideas from 'Essays on Intellectual Powers 3: Memory'

23644 Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid]
23643 We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid]
1356 A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid]
1359 Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid]
21319 I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid]
21323 The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid]
21321 Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid]
1350 Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid]
21322 We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid]
21320 Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid]
1352 Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid]
1367 Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid]
21324 If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid]
21325 Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid]
21327 If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid]
1366 If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid]