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Single Idea 14541

[filed under theme 7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events ]

Full Idea

Events are to be understood essentially as changes, rather than as property exemplifications. A particular exemplifying a property (as in Kim 1973 and Lewis 1986) would be better understood as a state of affairs.

Gist of Idea

Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs

Source

S.Mumford/R.Lill Anjum (Getting Causes from Powers [2011], 2.3)

Book Ref

Anjum,R.J./Mumford,S.: 'Getting Causes from Powers' [OUP 2011], p.23


A Reaction

I agree entirely with this. I've never been able to make sense of events as such static relations. It resembles the dubious Russellian view of motion as just being at one place and then at another.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [what we should take events to consist of]:

Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm]
Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan]
Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson]
Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis]
Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis]
Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis]
Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis]
If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA]
Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe]
Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe]
Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons]
Prolonged events don't seem to endure or exist at any particular time [Merricks]
I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons]
Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs [Mumford/Anjum]