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Single Idea 22225

[filed under theme 16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self ]

Full Idea

My I, in efffect, is no more certain for consciousness than the I of other men. It is only more intimate.

Gist of Idea

My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos

Source

Jean-Paul Sartre (Transcendence of the Ego [1937], p.104), quoted by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.1

Book Ref

Daigle,Christine: 'Jean-Paul Sartre' [Routledge 2010], p.23

A Reaction

Not sure how to assess this. Other people seem just as real as I do, when I encounter them, as friend or as foe. And in dealing with them we act as if dealing with their Self (rather than their legs, say). So this idea seems a good one.

The 21 ideas from 'Transcendence of the Ego'

22226 Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle]
7106 The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre]
7125 A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre]
7108 The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre]
7111 Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre]
7107 Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre]
7109 If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre]
7110 If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre]
7115 Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre]
7116 When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre]
7117 How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre]
7113 Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre]
7114 The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre]
7112 The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre]
7119 Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre]
7122 We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre]
7123 Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre]
7124 The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre]
7121 The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre]
7120 It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre]
22225 My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre]