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Single Idea 4126

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism ]

Full Idea

Hare's version of utilitarianism requires an agent to abandon any deeply held principle or conviction if a large enough aggregate of contrary preferences, of whatever kind, favours a contrary action.

Gist of Idea

If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views

Source

comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5

Book Ref

Williams,Bernard: 'Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy' [Fontana 1985], p.86


A Reaction

This nicely attacks any impersonal moral theory, whether it is based on reason or preferences. But where did my personal ideals come from?


The 17 ideas with the same theme [morality is our assertion of universal duties]:

Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer]
Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock]
Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot]
In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B]
Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B]
Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn]
Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B]