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Full Idea
Hare's version of utilitarianism requires an agent to abandon any deeply held principle or conviction if a large enough aggregate of contrary preferences, of whatever kind, favours a contrary action.
Gist of Idea
If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views
Source
comment on Richard M. Hare (Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point [1981]) by Bernard Williams - Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy Ch.5
Book Ref
Williams,Bernard: 'Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy' [Fontana 1985], p.86
A Reaction
This nicely attacks any impersonal moral theory, whether it is based on reason or preferences. But where did my personal ideals come from?
| 4125 | Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B] |
| 4126 | If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare] |
| 4127 | If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare] |
| 4360 | By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare] |
| 22483 | A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare] |