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Full Idea
Universal prescriptivists hold that 'ought'-judgements are prescriptive like plain imperatives, but differ from them in being universalisable.
Gist of Idea
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable
Source
Richard M. Hare (Universal Prescriptivism [1991], p.457)
Book Ref
'A Companion to Ethics', ed/tr. Singer,Peter [Blackwell 1993], p.457
A Reaction
Sounds a bit tautological. Which comes first, the normativity or the universalisability?
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |