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Single Idea 14258

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence ]

Full Idea

It is natural to suppose, in the case of such objects as Wooster and Jeeves, that in addition to possessing constitutive essential properties they will also enter into constitutive essential relationships.

Clarification

Wooster and Jeeves always appear together in the same works of fiction, as master and servant

Gist of Idea

Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties

Source

Kit Fine (Ontological Dependence [1995], III)

Book Ref

-: 'Aristotelian Society' [], p.282

A Reaction

I like this. If we are going to have scientific essences as structures of intrinsic powers, then the relationships between the parts of the essence must also be essential. That is the whole point - that the powers dictate the relationships.

The 17 ideas with the same theme [distinctions about how essence should be understood]:

11237 Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
12099 Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt]
15036 An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio]
11203 Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
22126 Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
16038 Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
5444 'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis]
5450 For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
12066 Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
11152 Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
14256 How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
14258 Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
15184 Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
15681 Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]