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Single Idea 12099

[filed under theme 9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence ]

Full Idea

The primary role of essences in Aristotle's theory of substance is causal, rather than classificatory.

Gist of Idea

Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory

Source

report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], ess) by Charlotte Witt - Substance and Essence in Aristotle 5.4

Book Ref

Witt,Charlotte: 'Substance and Essence in Aristotle' [Cornell 1994], p.179

A Reaction

This is the nicest summary of the view which I wish to champion. Classification results from patterns of causation, just as laws of nature result from regularities in the behaviour of causal powers.

Related Idea

Idea 11188 The Aristotelian view is that the essential properties are those that sort an object [Aristotle, by Marcus (Barcan)]

The 17 ideas with the same theme [distinctions about how essence should be understood]:

11237 Only universals have essence [Plato, by Politis]
12099 Aristotelian essences are causal, not classificatory [Aristotle, by Witt]
15036 An essence can either be universal (in the mind) or singular (in concrete particulars) [Avicenna, by Panaccio]
11203 Specific individual essence is defined by material, and generic essence is defined by form [Aquinas]
22126 Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
16038 Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E]
5444 'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis]
5450 For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner]
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
12066 Aristotelian and Kripkean essentialism are very different theories [Witt]
11152 Essences are either taken as real definitions, or as necessary properties [Fine,K]
14256 How do we distinguish basic from derived esssences? [Fine,K]
14258 Maybe some things have essential relationships as well as essential properties [Fine,K]
15184 Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
15681 Essentialism: real or representational? sortal, causal or ideal? real particulars, or placeholders? [Gelman]
14190 Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA]
17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]