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Single Idea 15323

[filed under theme 3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth ]

Full Idea

I take truth to be a property because the truth predicate has an extension - the collection of all true sentences - and this collection does not (unlike the 'extension' of 'exists') consist of everything, or even of all sentences.

Gist of Idea

Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension

Source

Leon Horsten (The Tarskian Turn [2011], 01.1)

Book Ref

Horsten,Leon: 'The Tarskian Turn' [MIT 2011], p.2


A Reaction

He concedes that it may be an 'uninteresting' property. My problem is always that I am unconvinced that truth is tied to sentences. I can make perfect sense of animal thoughts being right or wrong. Extension of mental propositions?

Related Idea

Idea 5420 Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell]


The 31 ideas with the same theme [whether truth exists, and what it is in general]:

Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle]
Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle]
Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle]
The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius]
There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero]
Anselm of Canterbury identified truth with God [Anselm, by Engel]
Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas]
Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf]
Truth is its own standard [Spinoza]
A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz]
The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz]
Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert]
Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell]
For Heidegger there is 'ontic' truth or 'uncoveredness', as in "he is a true friend" [Heidegger, by Wrathall]
Truth is a value of thought [Weil]
Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB]
'The rug is green' might be warrantedly assertible even though the rug is not green [Putnam]
Putnam's epistemic notion of truth replaces the realism of correspondence with ontological relativism [Putnam, by O'Grady]
It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett]
A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson]
Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock]
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton]
To say a relative truth is inexpressible in other frameworks is 'weak', while saying it is false is 'strong' [O'Grady]
The epistemic theory of truth presents it as 'that which is licensed by our best theory of reality' [O'Grady]
Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall]
Semantic theories of truth seek models; axiomatic (syntactic) theories seek logical principles [Horsten]
Truth is a property, because the truth predicate has an extension [Horsten]
Truth-value 'gluts' allow two truth values together; 'gaps' give a partial conception of truth [Halbach]
Truth axioms prove objects exist, so truth doesn't seem to be a logical notion [Halbach]
The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt]