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Single Idea 18500

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique ]

Full Idea

I do not understand how structures could serve as truthmakers for mathematical truths, ...Mathematical truths are not true in virtue of any way the universe is. ...Mathematical truths hold, whatever ways the universe is.

Gist of Idea

How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers

Source

John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 08.08)

Book Ref

Heil,John: 'The Universe as We Find It' [OUP 2012], p.172


A Reaction

I like the idea of enquiring about truthmakers for mathematical truths (and my view is more empirical than Heil's), but I think it may be a misunderstanding to think that structures are intended as truthmakers. Mathematics just IS structures?


The 23 ideas with the same theme [objections to structuralism about mathematics]:

If numbers are supposed to be patterns, each number can have many patterns [Frege]
Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell]
Different versions of set theory result in different underlying structures for numbers [Zermelo, by Brown,JR]
The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett]
Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett]
The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett]
Numbers can't be positions, if nothing decides what position a given number has [Bostock]
Structuralism falsely assumes relations to other numbers are numbers' only properties [Bostock]
We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis]
If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil]
Does someone using small numbers really need to know the infinite structure of arithmetic? [Shapiro]
If set theory is used to define 'structure', we can't define set theory structurally [Burgess]
Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess]
How can mathematical relations be either internal, or external, or intrinsic? [Burgess]
Sets seem basic to mathematics, but they don't suit structuralism [Brown,JR]
The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price]
For mathematical objects to be positions, positions themselves must exist first [MacBride]
Structuralism is right about algebra, but wrong about sets [Linnebo]
In mathematical structuralism the small depends on the large, which is the opposite of physical structures [Linnebo]
Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki]
If 'in re' structures relies on the world, does the world contain rich enough structures? [Colyvan]