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Single Idea 7046

[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique ]

Full Idea

I prefer the more colloquial 'object' to the traditional term 'substance'. An object can be regarded as a possessor of properties: as something that is red, spherical and pungent, for instance.

Gist of Idea

Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties

Source

John Heil (From an Ontological Point of View [2003], 15.3)

Book Ref

Heil,John: 'From an Ontological Point of View' [OUP 2005], p.172


A Reaction

A nice move, but it seems to beg the question of 'what is it that has the properties?' Objects and substances do two different jobs in our ontology. Heil is just refusing to discuss what it is that has properties.


The 20 ideas with the same theme [objections to the very concept of substances]:

Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes]
Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau]
We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke]
If a substance is just a thing that has properties, it seems to be a characterless non-entity [Leibniz, by Macdonald,C]
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]
The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume]
Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume]
The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant]
'Substance' is just a word for groupings and structures in experience [James]
An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell]
We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell]
The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell]
We can escape substance and its properties, if we take fields of pure powers as ultimate [Harré/Madden]
Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil]
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C]
When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C]
Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C]
A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C]
For corpuscularians, a substance is just its integral parts [Pasnau]