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Single Idea 15177

[filed under theme 10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible ]

Full Idea

Contradictoriness is the boundary both of what is possible and also of what is imaginable.

Gist of Idea

Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable

Source

Alan Sidelle (Necessity, Essence and Individuation [1989], Ch.4)

Book Ref

Sidelle,Alan: 'Necessity, Essence and Individuation' [Cornell 1989], p.89


A Reaction

Of course we may see contradictions where there are none, and fail to grasp real hidden contradictions, so the two do not coincide in the practice. I think I would say it is 'a' boundary, not 'the' boundary.


The 22 ideas from 'Necessity, Essence and Individuation'

Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider]
Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle]
Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle]
We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle]
A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle]
That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle]
Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle]
Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle]
That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle]
The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle]
Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle]
The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle]
A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle]
Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle]
To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle]
Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle]
There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle]
Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle]
Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle]
Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle]
'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle]