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Single Idea 3821
[filed under theme 16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
]
Full Idea
The requirement that I state reasons that I acted on requires a reference to the self. …Only for a self can something be a reason for an action.
Gist of Idea
Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self
Source
John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII)
Book Ref
Searle,John R.: 'Rationality in Action' [MIT 2001], p.86
A Reaction
Why can't we just say that this reason, given this desire and this belief, led to this action, and never mention the self? Admittedly leaving out 'I' is an odd circumlocution, but I don't find this particular argument very convincing.
The
34 ideas
from 'Rationality in Action'
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3811
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Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity
[Searle]
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3809
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If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic
[Searle]
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3810
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In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax
[Searle]
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3812
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Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality
[Searle]
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3814
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Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it
[Searle]
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3808
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Rational decision making presupposes free will
[Searle]
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3815
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The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action
[Searle]
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3813
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'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something
[Searle]
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3816
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Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief)
[Searle]
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3818
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We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective
[Searle]
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3817
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Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action
[Searle]
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3825
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Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't
[Searle]
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3826
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A self must at least be capable of consciousness
[Searle]
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3827
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The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced
[Searle]
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3828
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Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it"
[Searle]
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3822
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Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason
[Searle]
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3823
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Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity
[Searle]
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3821
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Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self
[Searle]
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3820
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The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally
[Searle]
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3824
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A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action
[Searle]
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3829
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Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible
[Searle]
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3830
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In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it
[Searle]
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3832
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Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events)
[Searle]
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3831
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Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states
[Searle]
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3833
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A belief is a commitment to truth
[Searle]
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3834
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An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self
[Searle]
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3835
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If it is true, you ought to believe it
[Searle]
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3836
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If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men
[Searle]
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3839
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Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act
[Searle]
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3837
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We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth
[Searle]
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3838
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Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution
[Searle]
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3840
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We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable
[Searle]
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3841
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Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings
[Searle]
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3806
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Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression
[Searle]
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