more on this theme     |     more from this thinker     |     more from this text


Single Idea 23731

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics ]

Full Idea

The 'externalist' view of morality says either that judgements of rightness are motives but not reasons, or (more strongly) that they are neither, meaning that moral judgements do not have practical implications.

Gist of Idea

'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives

Source

Michael Smith (The Moral Problem [1994], 3.1)

Book Ref

Smith,Michael: 'The Moral Problem' [Blackwell 1994], p.63


A Reaction

[Philippa Foot's untypical 1972 article is cited for the strong view. Hare and Blackburn are typical of the first view]. I would say that such judgements are both reasons and motives - but not necessarily for me! 'Someone should do something about this!'.

Related Ideas

Idea 23730 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]

Idea 23729 Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]