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Single Idea 23794

[filed under theme 18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content ]

Full Idea

Evans introduced the idea that there are some representational states, for example perceptual experiences, which have content that is nonconceptual.

Gist of Idea

Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual

Source

report of Gareth Evans (The Varieties of Reference [1980]) by Peter Schulte - Mental Content 3.4

Book Ref

Schulte,Peter: 'Mental Content' [CUP 2023], p.17


A Reaction

McDowell famously disagree, and whether all experience is inherently conceptualised is a main debate from that period. Hard to see how it could be settled, but I incline to McDowell, because minimal perception hardly counts as 'experience'.