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Full Idea
If someone thought that reasons can be characterised impersonally, say in terms of causal role …it is then glaringly obvious that feelings cannot be left out, so they have to be added on. Hence I introduce the idea of 'feeling towards'.
Gist of Idea
If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra
Source
Peter Goldie (The Emotions [2000], Intro)
Book Ref
Goldie,Peter: 'The Emotions' [OUP 2002], p.4
A Reaction
[compressed] That is, he wants us to see feelings as intentional, active, motivating and causal, and not the marginal epiphenomena implied by an impersonal account. I think he is right.