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Single Idea 23693

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics ]

Full Idea

Different considerations are on a par, in that judgement about what is required by practical rationality must take account of their interaction: of the weight of the ones we call non-moral as well as those we call moral.

Gist of Idea

Practical rationality must weigh both what is morally and what is non-morally required

Source

Philippa Foot (Natural Goodness [2001], 1)

Book Ref

Foot,Philippa: 'Natural Goodness' [OUP 2003], p.11


A Reaction

Her final settled view of rationalism in morality, it seems. The point is that moral considerations are not paramount, because she sees possible justifications for ignoring moral rules (like 'don't lie') in certain practical situations.

Related Ideas

Idea 23694 All criterions of practical rationality derive from goodness of will [Foot]

Idea 6183 Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant? [Kant]