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Single Idea 94

[filed under theme 22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure ]

Full Idea

Plato says the life of pleasure is more desirable with the addition of intelligence, and if the combination is better, pleasure is not the good.

Gist of Idea

Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good

Source

report of Plato (works [c.375 BCE]) by Aristotle - Nicomachean Ethics 1172b27

Book Ref

Aristotle: 'Ethics (Nicomachean)', ed/tr. ThomsonJ A K/TredennickH [Penguin 1976], p.314


A Reaction

It is obvious why we like pleasure, but not why intelligence makes it 'better'. Maybe it is just because we enjoy intelligence?


The 16 ideas with the same theme [pleasure is the main good in life]:

If happiness is bodily pleasure, then oxen are happy when they have vetch to eat [Heraclitus]
Happiness is identifying and separating the pleasures [Democritus, by Stobaeus]
In slaking our thirst the goodness of the action and the pleasure are clearly separate [Plato]
Good should be the aim of pleasant activity, not the other way round [Plato]
Even people who think pleasure is the good admit that there are bad pleasures [Plato]
Pleasure is better with the addition of intelligence, so pleasure is not the good [Plato, by Aristotle]
The masses believe, not unreasonably, that the good is pleasure [Aristotle]
Pleasure is not the Good, and not every pleasure is desirable [Aristotle]
Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus]
All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus]
Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus]
Pleasure is the chief good because it is the most natural, especially for animals [Epicurus, by Diog. Laertius]
Pleasure is not the good, because there are disgraceful pleasures [Chrysippus, by Diog. Laertius]
Justice can be preserved if pleasure is a good, but not if it is the goal [Chrysippus, by Plutarch]
Music is good for a melancholic, bad for a mourner, and indifferent to the deaf [Spinoza]
Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel]