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Single Idea 8295

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes ]

Full Idea

Why cannot a certain trope 'float free' of the trope-bundle to which it belongs and migrate to another bundle?

Gist of Idea

Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle?

Source

E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 9.8)

Book Ref

Lowe,E.J.: 'The Possibility of Metaphysics' [OUP 2001], p.207

A Reaction

Tropes are said to be dependent on their possessors, but at the same time to exist as particulars. Lowe's suggestion is that you can't have it both ways. A particular sphericity with no sphere does not even make sense.

The 198 ideas from E.J. Lowe

18351 Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe]
18352 Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe]
18353 Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe]
8967 Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe]
8968 If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe]
8965 Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe]
8966 Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe]
15541 Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement [Lowe, by Lewis]
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
16063 Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow]
16414 Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber]
8258 Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe]
9414 Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford]
8260 Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe]
8267 Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe]
8265 Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe]
8262 How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe]
8263 An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe]
8266 Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe]
8268 Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe]
8269 Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe]
8270 Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe]
8271 An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe]
8272 How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe]
8273 Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe]
8275 Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe]
8276 Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe]
8279 The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe]
8280 While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe]
8283 Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe]
8281 Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe]
8282 Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe]
8284 The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe]
8285 I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe]
8286 Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe]
8288 Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe]
8290 One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe]
8292 Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe]
8291 Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe]
8289 The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe]
8293 Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe]
8294 How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe]
8296 Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe]
8295 Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe]
16127 Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe]
16128 A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe]
16130 To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe]
16131 The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe]
15079 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe]
8298 Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe]
8297 Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe]
8299 Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe]
8300 Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe]
8301 Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe]
8302 Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe]
8305 A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe]
8303 Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe]
8306 You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe]
8307 Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe]
8308 Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe]
8310 Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe]
8309 A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe]
8311 If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe]
8312 It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe]
8313 Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe]
8314 Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe]
8315 Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe]
8316 Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe]
8317 To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe]
8318 The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe]
8319 One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe]
8320 Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe]
8321 All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe]
8322 I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe]
8323 It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe]
13122 Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff]
6617 The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe]
6631 If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe]
6619 Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe]
6618 A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe]
6629 Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe]
6622 Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe]
6626 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe]
6625 If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe]
6623 Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe]
6628 Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe]
6621 You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
6630 Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe]
6634 Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe]
6636 The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe]
6633 Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe]
6632 The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe]
6635 Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe]
6637 How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe]
6639 The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe]
6642 Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe]
6638 One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe]
6644 Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe]
6640 A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe]
6645 If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe]
6643 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe]
6641 Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe]
6646 The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe]
6648 Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe]
6647 Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe]
6653 Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe]
6651 People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe]
6652 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe]
6654 A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe]
6656 The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe]
6655 The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe]
6657 Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe]
6659 The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe]
6661 Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe]
6662 We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe]
6663 People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe]
6666 All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe]
6665 Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe]
6670 If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe]
6671 It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe]
6667 There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe]
16533 Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
16532 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
16531 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
16534 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe]
16535 A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
16547 H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]
16538 We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
16543 If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
16544 Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
16545 The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe]
16546 The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe]
16542 Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
16539 A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
16540 Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
16548 An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
16549 Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe]
16552 If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe]
16551 Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
16550 Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]
14581 The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum]
4205 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe]
4195 It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe]
4206 Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe]
4207 We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe]
4197 The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe]
4196 The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe]
4208 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe]
4209 The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe]
4210 If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe]
4211 Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe]
4212 Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe]
4213 Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe]
4214 Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe]
4194 Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe]
4193 The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe]
4215 It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe]
4217 It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe]
4219 Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe]
4220 Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe]
4221 Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe]
4222 If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe]
4223 Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe]
4224 If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe]
4225 Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe]
4227 Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe]
4198 If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe]
4228 If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe]
4199 A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe]
4229 An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe]
4200 If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe]
4232 Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe]
4233 If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe]
4234 Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe]
4235 Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe]
4236 Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe]
4237 Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe]
4238 The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe]
4239 Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe]
4240 It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe]
4241 If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe]
4201 Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG]
4202 Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe]
4203 Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe]
4204 Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe]
7783 Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe]
13917 Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe]
13919 Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe]
13918 Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe]
13921 All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe]
13922 Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe]
13920 Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe]