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Single Idea 7926

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind ]

Full Idea

We can usefully refer to 'individuation conditions', to distinguish objects of that kind from objects not of that kind, and to 'identity conditions', to distinguish objects within that kind from one another.

Gist of Idea

We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens

Source

Cynthia Macdonald (Varieties of Things [2005], Ch.2)

Book Ref

Macdonald,Cynthia: 'Varieties of Things' [Blackwell 2005], p.59


A Reaction

So we individuate types or sets, and identify tokens or particulars. Sounds good. Should be in every philosopher's toolkit, and on every introductory philosophy course.

Related Idea

Idea 8291 Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe]


The 40 ideas with the same theme [picking out things by giving their kind]:

Genus and species are substances, because only they reveal the primary substance [Aristotle, by Wedin]
Individuals within a species differ in their matter, form and motivating cause [Aristotle]
Genus gives the essence better than the differentiae do [Aristotle]
I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke]
Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P]
'Ultimate sortals' cannot explain ontological categories [Westerhoff on Wiggins]
A sortal essence is a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
Wiggins's sortal essentialism rests on a thing's principle of individuation [Wiggins, by Mackie,P]
'Sortalism' says parts only compose a whole if it falls under a sort or kind [Wiggins, by Hossack]
Identity a=b is only possible with some concept to give persistence and existence conditions [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
A thing is necessarily its highest sortal kind, which entails an essential constitution [Wiggins, by Strawson,P]
The evening star is the same planet but not the same star as the morning star, since it is not a star [Wiggins]
Many predicates are purely generic, or pure determiners, rather than sortals [Wiggins]
The possibility of a property needs an essential sortal concept to conceive it [Wiggins]
The only singling out is singling out 'as' something [Wiggins]
In Aristotle's sense, saying x falls under f is to say what x is [Wiggins]
Every determinate thing falls under a sortal, which fixes its persistence [Wiggins]
Sortal predications are answers to the question 'what is x?' [Wiggins]
A river may change constantly, but not in respect of being a river [Wiggins]
Sortal classification becomes science, with cross reference clarifying individuals [Wiggins]
If the kinds are divided realistically, they fall into substances [Wiggins]
'Human being' is a better answer to 'what is it?' than 'poet', as the latter comes in degrees [Wiggins]
Secondary substances correctly divide primary substances by activity-principles and relations [Wiggins]
We never single out just 'this', but always 'this something-or-other' [Wiggins]
Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C]
Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley]
The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider]
It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien]
Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe]
If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]
Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons]
No sortal could ever exactly pin down which set of particles count as this 'cup' [Schaffer,J]
We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C]
'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA]
If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA]
Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA]