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Single Idea 6733

[filed under theme 27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time ]

Full Idea

Whenever I attempt to frame a simple idea of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind, which flows uniformly and is participated in by all beings, I am lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties.

Gist of Idea

I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind

Source

George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], §98)

Book Ref

Berkeley,George: 'The Principles of Human Knowledge etc.', ed/tr. Warnock,G.J. [Fontana 1962], p.113

A Reaction

'Embrangled'! A nice statement of the idealist view of time, as entirely mental. I know what he means. However, surely he can manage to imagine a movement which continues when he shuts he eyes? Try blinking during a horse race.

The 69 ideas from George Berkeley

5192 Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations [Berkeley, by Ayer]
5174 Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things [Ayer on Berkeley]
1103 'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects [Russell on Berkeley]
6403 For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's [Berkeley, by Grayling]
5374 Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended [Russell on Berkeley]
3930 There is no such thing as 'material substance' [Berkeley]
3931 Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities [Berkeley]
3932 A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water [Berkeley]
3933 Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities [Berkeley]
3934 A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny [Berkeley]
3935 The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object [Berkeley]
3936 Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds [Berkeley]
3937 'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses [Berkeley]
3938 Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual [Berkeley]
3939 I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind [Berkeley]
3940 Distance is not directly perceived by sight [Berkeley]
3950 There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him [Berkeley]
3949 It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness [Berkeley]
3941 How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought? [Berkeley]
3942 I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it [Berkeley]
3943 If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception? [Berkeley]
3944 It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed. [Berkeley]
3945 There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it [Berkeley]
3946 A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition [Berkeley]
3947 Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind [Berkeley]
3948 Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own [Berkeley]
3951 There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent [Berkeley]
3952 I know that nothing inconsistent can exist [Berkeley]
3953 Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter [Berkeley]
3955 If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events [Berkeley]
3954 Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law [Berkeley]
3956 People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God [Berkeley]
3957 Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves [Berkeley]
3958 Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies [Berkeley]
3959 There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit [Berkeley]
18876 Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are [Berkeley, by Cameron]
6495 Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism [Robinson,H on Berkeley]
23636 Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds [Reid on Berkeley]
6491 Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought [Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
6720 Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations [Berkeley]
6721 Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self [Berkeley]
6723 The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds [Berkeley]
6722 Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit [Berkeley]
6724 The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives [Berkeley]
6726 No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities [Berkeley]
6728 Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion [Berkeley]
6727 Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold [Berkeley]
6729 Material substance is just general existence which can have properties [Berkeley]
6730 We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections [Berkeley]
6731 No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy [Berkeley]
6732 When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind [Berkeley]
6733 I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind [Berkeley]
6714 Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars [Berkeley]
6711 The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects [Berkeley]
22309 An idea can only be like another idea [Berkeley]
6734 If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature [Berkeley]
6735 All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move [Berkeley]
6736 I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects [Berkeley]
6737 Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings [Berkeley]
10581 I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas [Berkeley]
15861 The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience [Berkeley]
6713 If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason [Berkeley]
6715 Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars [Berkeley]
6716 Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas [Berkeley]
6717 Abstract ideas are impossible [Berkeley]
6718 I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought [Berkeley]
6719 No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas [Berkeley]
16636 A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents [Berkeley]
18091 Infinitesimals are ghosts of departed quantities [Berkeley]