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Single Idea 6076

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic ]

Full Idea

For Frege, a predicate does not refer to the objects of which it is true, but to the function that maps these objects onto the True and False; ..a predicate is a name for this function.

Gist of Idea

For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False

Source

report of Gottlob Frege (works [1890]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.3

Book Ref

McGinn,Colin: 'Logical Properties' [OUP 2003], p.67


A Reaction

McGinn says this is close to the intuitive sense of a property. Perhaps 'predicates are what make objects the things they are?'


The 6 ideas with the same theme [assigning predicates to objects in formulae]:

Aristotle's logic is based on the subject/predicate distinction, which leads him to substances and properties [Aristotle, by Benardete,JA]
Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn]
Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers]
The Comprehension Schema says there is a property only had by things satisfying a condition [Smith,P]
Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]