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Single Idea 3001

[filed under theme 17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique ]

Full Idea

Behaviourists had trouble providing a robust construal of mental causation (and hence had no logical space for a psychology of mental processes).

Clarification

A 'contrual' is an explanation

Gist of Idea

Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation

Source

Jerry A. Fodor (Psychosemantics [1987], p. 67)

Book Ref

Fodor,Jerry A.: 'Psychosemantics' [MIT 1993], p.67


A Reaction

If they could reduce all mental events to stimulus-response, that seems to fall within the normal procedures of physical causation. There is no problem of mental causation if your ontology is entirely physical.


The 25 ideas with the same theme [reasons why behaviourism is false]:

Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle]
Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach]
Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle]
Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle]
Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle]
What behaviour goes with mathematical beliefs? [Kim]
Behaviour depends on lots of mental states together [Kim]
Behaviour is determined by society as well as mental states [Kim]
Snakes have different pain behaviour from us [Kim]
Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor]
The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R]
Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood]
Animals don't just respond to stimuli, they experiment [Rey]
How are stimuli and responses 'similar'? [Rey]
Behaviour is too contingent and irrelevant to be the mind [Rey]
Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan]
Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton]
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]
No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil]
You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe]
How do behaviourists greet each other? [Sommers,W]