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Single Idea 16636
[filed under theme 9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
]
Full Idea
To me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And to say a die is hard, extended and square is not to attribute those qualities to a distinct subject, but only an explication of the word 'die'.
Gist of Idea
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents
Source
George Berkeley (The Principles of Human Knowledge [1710], n 49)
Book Ref
'A Companion to Metaphysics', ed/tr. Kim,Jaegwon/Sosa,Ernest [Blackwell 1995], p.65
A Reaction
This is apparently a reaction to Locke, and a final rejection of the medieval idea of a 'substance'. Unfortunately it leaves Berkeley with a 'bundle' view of objects (a typical empiricist account), which is even worse.
The
69 ideas
from George Berkeley
5192
|
Berkeley did not deny material things; he merely said they must be defined through sensations
[Berkeley, by Ayer]
|
5174
|
Berkeley needed a phenomenalist account of the self, as well as of material things
[Ayer on Berkeley]
|
1103
|
'To be is to be perceived' is a simple confusion of experience with its objects
[Russell on Berkeley]
|
6403
|
For Berkelely, reality is ideas and a community of minds, including God's
[Berkeley, by Grayling]
|
5374
|
Berkeley probably used 'idea' to mean both the act of apprehension and the thing apprehended
[Russell on Berkeley]
|
3930
|
There is no such thing as 'material substance'
[Berkeley]
|
3931
|
Sensible objects are just sets of sensible qualities
[Berkeley]
|
3932
|
A hot hand and a cold hand will have different experiences in the same tepid water
[Berkeley]
|
3933
|
Primary qualities (such as shape, solidity, mass) are held to really exist, unlike secondary qualities
[Berkeley]
|
3934
|
A mite would see its own foot as large, though we would see it as tiny
[Berkeley]
|
3935
|
The apparent size of an object varies with its distance away, so that can't be a property of the object
[Berkeley]
|
3936
|
Time is measured by the succession of ideas in our minds
[Berkeley]
|
3937
|
'Solidity' is either not a sensible quality at all, or it is clearly relative to our senses
[Berkeley]
|
3938
|
Geometry is originally perceived by senses, and so is not purely intellectual
[Berkeley]
|
3939
|
I conceive a tree in my mind, but I cannot prove that its existence can be conceived outside a mind
[Berkeley]
|
3940
|
Distance is not directly perceived by sight
[Berkeley]
|
3950
|
There must be a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by him
[Berkeley]
|
3949
|
It has been proved that creation is the workmanship of God, from its beauty and usefulness
[Berkeley]
|
3941
|
How can that which is unthinking be a cause of thought?
[Berkeley]
|
3942
|
I do not believe in the existence of anything, if I see no reason to believe it
[Berkeley]
|
3943
|
If existence is perceived directly, by which sense; if indirectly, how is it inferred from direct perception?
[Berkeley]
|
3944
|
It is possible that we could perceive everything as we do now, but nothing actually existed.
[Berkeley]
|
3945
|
There is nothing in nature which needs the concept of matter to explain it
[Berkeley]
|
3946
|
A thing is shown to be impossible if a contradiction is demonstrated within its definition
[Berkeley]
|
3947
|
Perceptions are ideas, and ideas exist in the mind, so objects only exist in the mind
[Berkeley]
|
3948
|
Experience tells me that other minds exist independently from my own
[Berkeley]
|
3951
|
There must be a God, because I and my ideas are not independent
[Berkeley]
|
3952
|
I know that nothing inconsistent can exist
[Berkeley]
|
3953
|
Real things and imaginary or dreamed things differ because the latter are much fainter
[Berkeley]
|
3955
|
If sin is not just physical, we don't consider God the origin of sin because he causes physical events
[Berkeley]
|
3954
|
Immorality is not in the action, but in the deviation of the will from moral law
[Berkeley]
|
3956
|
People are responsible because they have limited power, though this ultimately derives from God
[Berkeley]
|
3957
|
Immediate objects of perception, which some treat as appearances, I treat as the real things themselves
[Berkeley]
|
3958
|
Since our ideas vary when the real things are said to be unchanged, they cannot be true copies
[Berkeley]
|
3959
|
There is no other substance, in a strict sense, than spirit
[Berkeley]
|
18876
|
Berkeley does believe in trees, but is confused about what trees are
[Berkeley, by Cameron]
|
6495
|
Berkeley's idealism resulted from fear of scepticism in representative realism
[Robinson,H on Berkeley]
|
23636
|
Berkeley's idealism gives no grounds for believing in other minds
[Reid on Berkeley]
|
6491
|
Berkeley replaced intentionality with an anti-abstractionist imagist theory of thought
[Berkeley, by Robinson,H]
|
6720
|
Knowledge is of ideas from senses, or ideas of the mind, or operations on sensations
[Berkeley]
|
6721
|
Ideas are perceived by the mind, soul or self
[Berkeley]
|
6722
|
Perception is existence for my table, but also possible perception, by me or a spirit
[Berkeley]
|
6723
|
The 'esse' of objects is 'percipi', and they can only exist in minds
[Berkeley]
|
6724
|
The only substance is spirit, or that which perceives
[Berkeley]
|
6726
|
No one can, by abstraction, conceive extension and motion of bodies without sensible qualities
[Berkeley]
|
6727
|
Figure and extension seem just as dependent on the observer as heat and cold
[Berkeley]
|
6728
|
Motion is in the mind, since swifter ideas produce an appearance of slower motion
[Berkeley]
|
6729
|
Material substance is just general existence which can have properties
[Berkeley]
|
6730
|
We discover natural behaviour by observing settled laws of nature, not necessary connections
[Berkeley]
|
6731
|
No one can explain how matter affects mind, so matter is redundant in philosophy
[Berkeley]
|
6732
|
When I shut my eyes, the things I saw may still exist, but in another mind
[Berkeley]
|
6733
|
I cannot imagine time apart from the flow of ideas in my mind
[Berkeley]
|
6714
|
Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars
[Berkeley]
|
6711
|
The mind creates abstract ideas by considering qualities separated from their objects
[Berkeley]
|
22309
|
An idea can only be like another idea
[Berkeley]
|
6734
|
If properties and qualities arise from an inward essence, we will remain ignorant of nature
[Berkeley]
|
6735
|
All motion is relative, so a single body cannot move
[Berkeley]
|
6736
|
I know other minds by ideas which are referred by me to other agents, as their effects
[Berkeley]
|
6737
|
Particular evils are really good when linked to the whole system of beings
[Berkeley]
|
10581
|
I can only combine particulars in imagination; I can't create 'abstract' ideas
[Berkeley]
|
15861
|
The laws of nature are mental regularities which we learn by experience
[Berkeley]
|
6713
|
If animals have ideas, and are not machines, they must have some reason
[Berkeley]
|
6715
|
Universals do not have single meaning, but attach to many different particulars
[Berkeley]
|
6716
|
Language is presumably for communication, and names stand for ideas
[Berkeley]
|
6717
|
Abstract ideas are impossible
[Berkeley]
|
6718
|
I can't really go wrong if I stick to wordless thought
[Berkeley]
|
6719
|
No one will think of abstractions if they only have particular ideas
[Berkeley]
|
16636
|
A die has no distinct subject, but is merely a name for its modes or accidents
[Berkeley]
|
18091
|
Infinitesimals are ghosts of departed quantities
[Berkeley]
|