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Single Idea 16076

[filed under theme 9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object ]

Full Idea

I want to resuscitate an essentialist argument against the view that constitution is identity, of the form 'x is essentially F, y is not essentially F, so x is not y'.

Gist of Idea

Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows

Source

Lynne Rudder Baker (Why Constitution is not Identity [1997], Intro)

Book Ref

-: 'Journal of Philosophy' [-], p.599

A Reaction

The point is that x might be essentially F and y only accidentally F. Thus a statue is essentially so, but a lump if clay is not essentially a statue. Another case where 'necessary' would do instead of 'essentially'.

The 21 ideas with the same theme [objects should be understood as what they are made of]:

16066 Additional or removal of any part changes a thing, so people are never the same person [Epicharmus]
6019 If someone squashed a horse to make a dog, something new would now exist [Mnesarchus]
16995 Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke]
17047 If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke]
11868 A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
14264 Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
14267 There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
16076 Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker]
16081 The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker]
16082 Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker]
16228 The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley]
16229 Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley]
14492 If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley]
15848 Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
6130 'Composition' says things are their parts; 'constitution' says a whole substance is an object [Merricks]
6138 It seems wrong that constitution entails that two objects are wholly co-located [Merricks]
12867 A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons]
13279 There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki]
16065 Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman]
16067 Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman]
16069 There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman]