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Single Idea 14995

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates ]

Full Idea

For Armstrong a predicate is sparse when there exists a corresponding universal; for Lewis, a predicate is sparse when there exists a corresponding natural property or relation.

Gist of Idea

Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation

Source

Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 06)

Book Ref

Sider,Theodore: 'Writing the Book of the World' [OUP 2011], p.85

A Reaction

I like 'sparse' properties, but have no sympathy with Armstrong, and am cautious about Lewis. I like Shoemaker's account, which makes properties even sparser. 'Abundant' so-called properties are my pet hate. They are 'predicates'!

The 49 ideas from 'Writing the Book of the World'

14977 Metaphysics is not about what exists or is true or essential; it is about the structure of reality [Sider]
14978 A property is intrinsic if an object alone in the world can instantiate it [Sider]
14980 There is a real issue over what is the 'correct' logic [Sider]
14981 Philosophical concepts are rarely defined, and are not understood by means of definitions [Sider]
14982 If I used Ramsey sentences to eliminate fundamentality from my theory, that would be a real loss [Sider]
14984 Which should be primitive in mereology - part, or overlap? [Sider]
14983 Accept the ontology of your best theory - and also that it carves nature at the joints [Sider]
14985 The notion of law doesn't seem to enhance physical theories [Sider]
14986 Conceptual analysts trust particular intuitions much more than general ones [Sider]
14988 A theory which doesn't fit nature is unexplanatory, even if it is true [Sider]
14987 Many of the key theories of modern physics do not appear to be 'laws' [Sider]
14990 Bayes produces weird results if the prior probabilities are bizarre [Sider]
14989 Problem predicates in induction don't reflect the structure of nature [Sider]
14991 Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider]
14992 We don't care about plain truth, but truth in joint-carving terms [Sider]
14994 Extreme doubts about metaphysics also threaten to undermine the science of unobservables [Sider]
14995 Predicates can be 'sparse' if there is a universal, or if there is a natural property or relation [Sider]
14997 Two applications of 'grue' do not guarantee a similarity between two things [Sider]
15001 'Tonk' is supposed to follow the elimination and introduction rules, but it can't be so interpreted [Sider]
15000 'It is raining' and 'it is not raining' can't be legislated, so we can't legislate 'p or ¬p' [Sider]
14999 Prior to conventions, not all green things were green? [Sider]
14998 Conventions are contingent and analytic truths are necessary, so that isn't their explanation [Sider]
15004 'Gunk' is an object in which proper parts all endlessly have further proper parts [Sider]
15005 Explanations must cite generalisations [Sider]
15003 It seems unlikely that the way we speak will give insights into the universe [Sider]
15008 Is fundamentality in whole propositions (and holistic), or in concepts (and atomic)? [Sider]
15009 We must distinguish 'concrete' from 'abstract' and necessary states of affairs. [Sider]
15010 Your metaphysics is 'cheating' if your ontology won't support the beliefs you accept [Sider]
15012 Orthodox truthmaker theories make entities fundamental, but that is poor for explanation [Sider]
15011 If the ultimate explanation is a list of entities, no laws, patterns or mechanisms can be cited [Sider]
15013 Tables and chairs have fundamental existence, but not fundamental natures [Sider]
15017 Supervenience is a modal connection [Sider]
15014 Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
15015 It seems possible for a correct definition to be factually incorrect, as in defining 'contact' [Sider]
15016 Analyticity has lost its traditional role, which relied on truth by convention [Sider]
15019 Define logical constants by role in proofs, or as fixed in meaning, or as topic-neutral [Sider]
15020 Classical logic is good for mathematics and science, but less good for natural language [Sider]
15021 The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider]
15024 The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider]
15023 The Barcan schema implies if X might have fathered something, there is something X might have fathered [Sider]
15025 The world does not contain necessity and possibility - merely how things are [Sider]
15026 Essence (even if nonmodal) is not fundamental in metaphysics [Sider]
15027 If truths are necessary 'by convention', that seems to make them contingent [Sider]
15028 Conventionalism doesn't seem to apply to examples of the necessary a posteriori [Sider]
15033 Humeans says mathematics and logic are necessary because that is how our concept of necessity works [Sider]
15030 Humeans say that we decide what is necessary [Sider]
15029 Modal accounts of logical consequence are simple necessity, or essential use of logical words [Sider]
15031 Modal terms in English are entirely contextual, with no modality outside the language [Sider]
15018 Intentionality is too superficial to appear in the catalogue of ultimate physics [Sider]