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Single Idea 12792

[filed under theme 7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff ]

Full Idea

The central fact about the category of stuff or matter is that it is profoundly antithetical to reference.

Gist of Idea

The category of stuff does not suit reference

Source

Henry Laycock (Words without Objects [2006], Pref)

Book Ref

Laycock,Henry: 'Words without Objects' [OUP 2006], p.-5


A Reaction

This is taking 'reference' in the strictly singular classical sense, but clearly we refer to water in various ways. Laycock's challenge is very helpful. We have been in the grips of a terrible orthodoxy.


The 17 ideas with the same theme [general masses which are fairly homogeneous]:

A composite is a true unity if all of its parts fall under one essence [Scheibler]
Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell]
Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine]
Hard individual blocks don't fix what 'things' are; fluids are no less material things [Harré/Madden]
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen]
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien]
Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
Unlike things, stuff obeys unrestricted composition and mereological essentialism [Sider]
Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons]
Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons]
Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons]
The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki]