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Single Idea 11892
[filed under theme 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
]
Full Idea
A may be a counterpart of B according to one counterpart relation (similarity of origin, say), but not according to another (similarity of later history).
Gist of Idea
Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation
Source
Penelope Mackie (How Things Might Have Been [2006], 5.3)
Book Ref
Mackie,Penelope: 'How Things Might Have Been' [OUP 2006], p.86
A Reaction
Hm. Would two very diverse things have to be counterparts because they were kept in the same cupboard in different worlds? Can the counterpart relationship diverge or converge over time? Yes, I presume.
The
18 ideas
from Penelope Mackie
11877
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An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without
[Mackie,P]
|
11906
|
The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications
[Mackie,P]
|
11905
|
Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind
[Mackie,P]
|
11909
|
Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary
[Mackie,P]
|
11907
|
Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not
[Mackie,P]
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11882
|
No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object
[Mackie,P]
|
11883
|
A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing
[Mackie,P]
|
11884
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The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities
[Mackie,P]
|
11886
|
There are problems both with individual essences and without them
[Mackie,P]
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11887
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Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities'
[Mackie,P]
|
11889
|
Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences
[Mackie,P]
|
11890
|
De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts
[Mackie,P]
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11892
|
Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation
[Mackie,P]
|
11893
|
Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar
[Mackie,P]
|
11894
|
Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions
[Mackie,P]
|
11897
|
A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time
[Mackie,P]
|
11898
|
Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence
[Mackie,P]
|
11899
|
Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential?
[Mackie,P]
|