Single Idea 5680

[catalogued under 12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique]

Full Idea

For a direct realist our awareness of colour and heat can hardly be of a different order from our awareness of shape and size. Both sorts of properties are presented with equal directness.

Gist of Idea

For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct

Source

Jonathan Dancy (Intro to Contemporary Epistemology [1985], 10.3)

Book Reference

Dancy,Jonathan: 'Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology' [Blackwell 1985], p.150


A Reaction

This is a good objection to 'direct scientific realism', which claims direct apprehension of primary qualities alongside a totally relative view of secondary qualities. The best response seems to be to move to a representative view of primary properties.