Single Idea 4769

[catalogued under 15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 9. Perceiving Causation]

Full Idea

There is a problem if causation is the object of our analysis, but is also presupposed (as an empirical principle of human psychology) for the functioning of the mind.

Gist of Idea

It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind

Source

Stathis Psillos (Causation and Explanation [2002], §1.7)

Book Reference

Psillos,Stathis: 'Causation and Explanation' [Acumen 2002], p.42


A Reaction

This doesn't sound like a major problem. If it is, it is presumably impossible to analyse the mind, because a mind is presupposed in the process of analysis.