Single Idea 2552

[catalogued under 17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique]

Full Idea

Why should an epistemic distinction reflect an ontological distinction? Why should our epistemic privilege of being incorrigible about how things seem to us reflect a distinction between two realms of being?

Clarification

'Epistemic' distinctions are to do with what we know; 'Ontological' distinctions are to do with how things actually are.

Gist of Idea

Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different

Source

comment on René Descartes (Meditations [1641], §6.78) by Richard Rorty - Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 1.2

Book Reference

Rorty,Richard: 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' [Blackwell 1980], p.29


A Reaction

This strikes me as being one of the most important ideas in philosophy, mainly as a corrective to a lot of bad philosophy, rather than as wisdom offered to non-philosophers (for whom Rorty's thought is probably common sense. How is it? How do we know?