Single Idea 23804

[catalogued under 18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content]

Full Idea

The phenomenal intentionality approach says that the content properties of mental states can be explained in terms of the phenomenal properties of mental states.

Gist of Idea

Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties

Source

Peter Schulte (Mental Content [2023], 6)

Book Reference

Schulte,Peter: 'Mental Content' [CUP 2023], p.44


A Reaction

[Searle and Loar are cited] Tends to be 'non-naturalistic'. We might decide that content derives from the phenomenal, but still without saying anything interesting about content. Mathematical content? Universally generalised content?

Related Idea

Idea 23805 Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]