Single Idea 23737

[catalogued under 20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes]

Full Idea

Only the Humean theory is able to make sense of reason explanation as a species of teleological explanation, and one may accept that reason explanations are teleological without accepting that they are causal.

Gist of Idea

Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them

Source

comment on Donald Davidson (Action, Reasons and Causes [1963]) by Michael Smith - The Moral Problem 4.6

Book Reference

Smith,Michael: 'The Moral Problem' [Blackwell 1994], p.113


A Reaction

That is, reasons can give a purpose to an action, and thereby motivate it, without actually causing it. I agree with Smith. I certainly don't (usually, at least) experience reasons as directly producing my actions. Hume says desires are needed.