Single Idea 14673

[catalogued under 10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions]

Full Idea

It is not a good idea to think of possible worlds as sets of propositions, and at the same time to think of propositions as sets of possible worlds.

Gist of Idea

You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds

Source

Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I n3)

Book Reference

Salmon,Nathan: 'Metaphysics, Mathematics and Meaning' [OUP 2005], p.131


A Reaction

Salmon favours thinking of worlds as sets of propositions, and hence rejects the account of propositions as sets of worlds. He favours the 'Russellian' view of propositions, which seem to me to be the same as 'facts'.